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Military Law -COURTS-MARTIAL
- RECENTCASESDEFININGTHE
RIGHTTO COUNSEL
BEFORESUMMARY
COURTS-MARTIAL

In June, 1972, the United States Supreme Court expanded the sixth
amendment right to counsel by holding in Argersinger u. Hamlinl that
absent a valid waiver no one could be imprisoned for even a "minor"
offense unless he had been assisted by counsel at trial.2 The Navy and
Marine Corps considered this expansion inapplicable to summary courtsmartial,3 thereby leaving marines and sailors to be tried, convicted, and
sentenced to confinement for minor offenses without a right to appointed
counsel. Several such convictions were challenged in the federal courts
and the Court of Military appeal^,^ but conflicting rulings resulted. T h e
Court of Military Appeals and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held Argersinger applicable to all summary courts-martial,5 thus guaranteeing servicemen a right to counsel before confinement may be imposed. T h e Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding
both the sixth amendment and the Argersinger ruling inapplicable to
summary courts-martial and prescribing its own version of a right to
counsel in summary courts-martial based on fifth amendment due pro'407 U.S. 25 (1972).
2Zd. at 37.
3The summary, special, and general courts-martial comprise the military trial court system.
T h e summary court differs from the other two in that it may try only those servicemen who
are not officers, cadets, or midshipmen, and may adjudge only those sentences equivalent to,
or less than, one month's confinement. While the special and general courts-martial are composed of either a military judge or a panel of officers, the summary court-martial consists of a
single commissioned officer. In either the general or special court-martial the accused is
provided with defense counsel by military law; in the summary court-martial one has had no
JUSTICEarts. 16-27, 10 U.S.C. $0 816-27
such established right. UNIFORM
CODEOF MILITARY
(1970) [hereinafter cited as U.C.M. J.] .
4This case note considers four cases that challenged the Navy's position. Daigle v. Warner,
348 F. Supp. 1074 (D. Hawaii 1972), rev'd, 490 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1973); Henry v. Warner, 357
F. Supp. 495 (C.D. Cal. 1973), vacated, 493 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted sub n o m .
Middendorf v. Henry, 95 S. Ct. 173 (1974) (No. 74-175); Betonie v. Sizemore, 369 F. Supp. 340
(M.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd i n part and rev'd i n part, 496 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Alderman, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 298,46 C.M.R. 298 (1973).
T h e factual settings in the three federal court cases were similar: enlisted members of the
Navy and Marine Corps were tried and sentenced to confinement by summary courts-martial
without the right to counsel. Their sentences were then challenged in the federal courts by
petitions for writs of habeas corpus, thereby directly presenting the question of the applicability of Argersinger to summary courts-martial.
In the military case, the Court of Military Appeals considered the admissibility of evidence
of a previous summary court-martial conviction, which had been obtained without the assistance of counsel, in determining the sentence to be imposed following a special court-martial
conviction. This setting indirectly required the court to determine the applicability of Argersinger to the military.
Wnited States v. Alderman, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973); Betonie v. Sizemore,
496 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1974).
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cess grounds.6 As a result of the Ninth Circuit's position on the right-tocounsel issue, the case of Middendorfv. Henry' is on appeal to the Supreme Court, presenting that Court with its first opportunity to decide
whether the Constitution guarantees a right to counsel to servicemen before summary courts-martial.8

A. The Right to Counsel in Civilian Courts
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution declares that
"in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. The meaning of this provision
has developed throughout our history, with much of the significant interpretation dating from 1932 when, in Powell v. Alabama,g the Supreme
Court held that due process of law1o requires the states to provide an
accused with the assistance of counsel in capital cases.ll Then, in Johnson v. Zerbst,l2 the Court construed the sixth amendment to mean that
no federal criminal conviction can stand unless the accused had, or
waived, the assistance of counsel. In 1963, the Court held in Gideon v.
Wainwright13 that the right to the assistance of counsel is a fundamental
right which is essential to a fair trial,l4 and that due process is violated if
"

6Daigle v. Warner, 490 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1973); Henry v. Warner, 493 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir.
1974),cert. granted sub nom. Middendorf v. Henry, 95 S. Ct. 173 (1974) (No. 74-175).
'95 S. Ct. 173 (1974) (No. 74-175) (J. William Middendorf I1 has replaced John E. Warner
as Secretary of the Navy, and the title of the case has therefore been changed from Warner v .
Henry.).
8The case was argued before the Court on January 22, 1975. 43 U.S.L.W. 3414 (U.S. 1975).
9287 US. 45 (1932).
1OThe right to counsel was applied to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 7 1.
"The Court also emphasized the importance of the assistance of counsel:
T h e right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend
the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of law. . . . He requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces
the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
Id. at 68-69.
12304 U.S. 458 (1938).
'3372 U.S. 335 (1963).
l4The Court stated:
T h e right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and
essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our
state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and
substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which
every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the
poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.
Id. at 344.

2851

CASE NOTES

287

a state felony conviction is obtained without the accused's having had the
right to appointed counsel at trial.15
The Supreme Court's holding in Argersinger added a new but consistent dimension to this historical development. In Argersinger, the
Court held that due process requires that no person may be imprisoned
for any offense unless he is represented by counsel at trial.16

B. T h e Right to Counsel i n Military Courts
T h e right to counsel in the military courts has closely paralleled the
civilian right, not because the civilian standards control in the military,
but because Congress has evidenced an intent to conform military law as
closely as possible to the standards of civilian courts.l7 The Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) directs that defense counsel must be
appointed for all accused before general and special courts-martia1,lg
the military trial courts which have exclusive jurisdiction of all felony
and the more serious misdemeanor cases.lg T h e UCMJ makes no provisions, however, for the appointment of counsel in summary courtsmartial, where less serious offenses are tried, even though these courts
. ~is~ this potential
may impose sentences of up to 30 days ~ o n f i n e m e n t It
of confinement without the right to appointed counsel that has raised the
issue of the applicability of Argersinger to trials by summary courtsmartial.

C. T h e Relationship of Civilian to Military Courts
Direct application of Argersinger to the military courts is inhibited
because of the unique status of military jurisprudence. T h e military
judicial system has its constitutional base in article 1, where Congress is
granted express powers over the land and naval forces.21 Pursuant to
its power to make rules for the regulation of the armed forces, Congress
l5The Court confirmed its decision in Powell that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment incorporates the sixth amendment's guarantee of a right to counsel. I d . at 841-42.
16407U.S. at 37.
All four of these cases -Powell, Johnson, Gideon, and Argersinger -involved settings in
which defense counsel was permitted, but not provided. Only those who could not afford
counsel were denied it.
The Argersinger holding allowed for "knowing and intelligent" waivers of the right to
counsel therein defined. This case note assumes that the same qualification would accompany
an application of Argersinger to military procedure.
l7Several of the 1968 Amendments to the UCMJ were for the express purpose of conforming
military criminal procedure more closely to that of federal district courts. S. RJZP.NO. 1601,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 10, 11 (1968).
lsU.C.M.J. art. 27, 10 U.S.C. 5 827 (1970).
l9U.C.M.J. arts. 18-19, 10 U.S.C. 55 818-19 (1970).
20U.C.M.J.art. 20, 10 U.S.C. 5 820 (1970).
21U.S. CONST.art. I, 5 8 provides: "The Congress shall have Power. . . T o make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces. . . ."
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has provided the military with its own code of lawz2and judicial ~ystem,~3
including its own "supreme court," the Court of Military Appeals
(COMA).24 Hence, the military judicial system is separate and distinct
from the federal judiciary.25
In this structural aspect of the military-federal relationship, the military judicial system stands vis-i-vis the federal judiciary in a position
similar to that of any state judicial system. But in the interactional aspect,
there are important differences between the military-federal and the statefederal relationships. For example, the federal and state systems are
often alternative adjudicatory forums,26with each commonly interpreting the other's laws. Furthermore, state convictions are subject to federal
7 direct appeal is available from final state
habeas corpus r e v i e ~ , ~and
supreme court decisions to the United States Supreme Court." By contrast, the only direct link between the military and the federal judicial
systems is limited habeas corpus review of military decisions by the
federal c0urts.~9
22The Uniform Code of Military Justice was enacted to cover "both the substantive and the
procedural law governing military justice and its administration in all of the armed forces of
the United States." S. REP. NO. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. l(1949). All persons in the military,
and some who are not, are subject to the Uniform Code. U.C.M.J. art. 2, 10 U.S.C. 8 802
(1970). T h e UCMJ applies in all places. U.C.M.J. art. 5, 10 U.S.C. § 805 (1970).
23The military judicial system includes a unique set of trial courts. U.C.M.J. art. 16, 10
U.S.C. 5 816 (1970). See also note 3 supra. In addition, the military has a separate bar. See,
e.g., U.C.M.J. art. 27, 10 U.S.C. 5 827 (1970), which requires that counsel appointed for a
general court-martial be certified by the Judge Advocate General.
For the purposes of this case note, the most distinctive aspect of the military judicial system
is its scheme of appellate review. U.C.M.J. arts. 59-76, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859-76 (1970). Essentially
the appellate review system can be divided into two parts: one administrative and one judicial.
T h e administrative part is performed first. It involves review of the court-martial record first
by the convening authority, and then by the office of the Judge Advocate General of the
service involved. There is also the possibility of petitioning the Secretary of one's service or the
President for redress. T h e second part is the judicial, consisting of review by a Court of Military Review and finally appeal to the Court of Military Appeals. T h e judicial review is only
provided for those cases involving an officer or some serious sentence, e.g., a sentence to confinement for 1 year or more. Hence, one convicted by a summary court-martial has no statutory
right to judicial review. For a discussion of this lack of judicial review of summary courtmartial convictions, its consequences, and possible remedies, see 1974 UTAHL. b v . 612.
24Appellate review by the Court of Military Appeals is final -"binding upon all departments, courts, agencies, and officers of the United States. . . ." U.C.M. J. art. 76, 10 U.S.C. § 876
(1970); see S. REP. NO. 486,81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 , 6 (1949).
T h e Supreme Court and Congress agree that this provision does permit, however, a limited
habeas corpus review by civilian courts. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953); S. b ~NO.
.
486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1949). See also note 29 infra.
25See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137,140 (1953).
26This "alternative" relationship is illustrated by the fact that cases properly in state court
can be removed to federal court. 28 U.S.C. $5 1441-51 (1970).
2728U.S.C. 9 2241 (1970).
2828 U.S.C. 5 1257 (1970).
29Traditionally, federal habeas corpus review has been more narrow in military than in
civil cases, limited to insuring that the military court-martial has exercised proper jurisdiction
or, at best, has dealt fully and fairly with the allegation raised. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137

CASE NOTES

A. Should Argersinger and the Sixth Amendment Apply to
Summary Courts-Martial?
1. Ninth Circuit's analysis. The Henry case was summarily vacated
and remanded by the Ninth Circuit3O "under the compulsion" of its
~ Daigle the Ninth
opinion in the earlier case of Daigle v . W ~ r n e r . 3In
Circuit held the sixth amendment inapplicable to trials by summary
court-martial after examining what "the framers of the Bill of Rights
intended." T h e court reasoned that since the framers meant to recognize the practice that had developed in colonial America, and since at
that time no right to counsel as required by Argersinger existed in the
military, the framers intended no such right.32 T h e court did hold, however, that courts-martial must afford an accused due process of law as
guaranteed by the fifth amendment, reasoning that since the fifth
amendment due process clause is an evolving concept, its applicability
is not limited by historical practices.33 T o satisfy due process the court
analogized to the limited right-tocounsel standard now applied in parole
or probation revocation proceedings34 and prescribed that in summary
courts-martial the military need appoint counsel only upon request, and
(1953). For a discussion of the reasons against such a limited habeas corpus review see Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's separate opinion on denial of rehearing. Id. at 844.
SoHenry v. Warner, 493 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted sub nom. Middendorf v.
Henry, 95 S. Ct. 173 (1974) (No. 74-175).
3l490 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1973).
32Zd.at 363-64.
33Id. at 364.
34The Ninth Circuit disregarded the due process aspect of Argersinger where the Supreme
Court was considering what right to counsel the due process clause guarantees one accused
by a state of a "petty" offense, and where the Court's holding defines the due process standard.
407 U.S. at 27-29.
T h e Ninth Circuit looked to the standards in juvenile delinquency proceedings and
probation-revocation hearings for an applicable due process guidepost. It considered those
two because they involved the extent to which due process requires counsel in situations
where imprisonment "may be imposed but the Sixth Amendment does not apply." 490 F.2d
at 364. (The standard in juvenile delinquency proceedings was set forth by the Supreme
Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); the rule for probation-revocation hearings was established in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 41 1 U.S. 778 (1973).)
T h e circuit court found Gagnon more applicable than Gault to summary courts-martial
because (1) servicemen are adults and presumably do not have difficulty presenting a defense
or mitigating circumstances without the aid of counsel, and (2) summary courts-martial are
less adversary and accusatory than are juvenile court proceedings, and so need to be informal
and flexible, as are probation-revocation hearings. 490 F.2d at 365.
T h e Supreme Court considered an adult's need for the assistance of counsel in Powell, concluding that even an "intelligent and educated layman.. . needs the guiding hand of counsel
at every step in the proceedings against him." See note 11 supra. Furthermore, the Court
carefully explained the bases of its decision in Gagnon, i.e., there are critical differences between criminal trials and probation-revocation hearings; and since a probationer has already
been convicted of a crime, he has a more limited due process right than the right to counsel
of an accused in a criminal prosecution. 41 1 U.S. at 788-89 & n.12.
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then only if it is evident that the accused has a defense or claim of mitigating circumstances that cannot be adequately presented without assistance of c0unsel.3~
The Ninth Circuit's strictly historical test for applicability of the sixth
amendment is improper for two reasons. First, the sixth amendment
right to counsel, as Chief Justice Burger has noted,36 has been an evolving
concept in terms of both substance and availability from what it was in
1791.s7 Although the intent of the amendment's framers may be a
relevant factor in determining the applicability of today's right to counsel, that intent cannot reasonably be the sole criterion.38 Second, even if
the founders did not intend the Bill of Rights to apply to the miniscule
Army and nonexistent Navy of 1789-1791, as one commentator sugg e ~ t s , 3it~does not follow that the founders would have had the same
opinion had they been dealing with the greatly enlarged armed forces
and the greatly widened military jurisdiction of today.40 The Supreme
Court has indicated that a proper application of a constitutional provision should involve a consideration of current realities and needs.41
35490 F.2d at 364-65.
s6Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. at 44.
37E. g., in terms of substance, juvenile court procedures including the representation of an
accused's interests by multipurpose probation officers or judges were struck down in 1967,
after having prevailed for over half a century and after having withstood constitutional attack
in over 40 jurisdictions. T h e new standard is personal, appointed counsel. In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967).
T h e cases of Powell, Johnson, Gideon, and Argersinger exemplify the evolution in the availability of the right to counsel. An indigent accused of a capital offense in state court has had a
right to counsel only since 1932, while the same man accused of any other felony in state court
has had a right to counsel only since 1963.
38The U.S. District Court for Hawaii in Daigle and the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California in Henry recognized that the correct starting point for a determination of
Argersinger's applicability to military court-martial procedures was an examination of the
thencurrent right to counsel in the military, rather than the framers' intent. T h e courts found
that by the time Argersinger came down the military had recognized the importance of counsel,
and in fact had provided a right to counsel that in some respects was broader than the civilian
right. T h e question for the courts then became one of considering whether the summary courtmartial procedure generates the same need for counsel the Supreme Court found that state
misdemeanor trials generate, and weighing against that need the mitigating effect of any
peculiar needs of the military. Daigle v. Warner, 348 F. Supp. 1074, 1078-80 (D. Hawaii 1972);
Henry v. Warner, 357 F. Supp. 495,503-04 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
39Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice (pts. I, 11), 72
HARV.L. h v . 1, 266 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Weiner] . Contra, Henderson, Courts-Martial
L. b v . 293 (1957).
and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 71 HARV.
*OWiener, supra note 39, at 302.
It is interesting to note that while the Ninth Circuit relied for its holding on Wiener's
historical analysis and accepted his conclusion that the framers intended that the Bill of Rights
not apply to the military, the court seemed to disregard entirely Wiener's argument that
changed circumstances have made the original intent immaterial today. 490 F.2d at 364.
4lIn extending the right to counsel to a postindictment police lineup in United States v.
Wade, the Supreme Court noted that at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted there were
no police forces as we know them. However, in recognition of the "realities of modern
criminal prosecution," the Court has interpreted the sixth amendment guarantee to apply
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The aberrational aspect of the Ninth Circuit's holding is further
illustrated by the fact that the five other courts, including COMA, that
have considered the question have held that the sixth amendment and
Argersinger apply to military courts-martial.42
2. T h e standard deueloped by the Court of Military Appeals.
COMA is the court Congress established to define military law, and it
has developed the most appropriate and compelling test for determining
the applicability of constitutional standards to the military.43 Under
this COMA test the fully defined constitutional right to counsel, like
all other constitutional standards announced by the Supreme Court,
applies in the military system unless the adaptation or restriction of that
right is required by military peculiarity. This test, unlike the Ninth Circuit's standard, properly considers the present status of the right to counsel in federal and state courts and the current composition and needs of
the military.
It is significant that all six of the courts that have considered the question of a right to counsel in military trials weighed the effect of providing
defense counsel in summary courts-martial on the military's ability to
perform its unique function. While the courts agreed that military
peculiarity may require some adaptation in the type of assistance provided, none of the six held that the unique aspects of the military and its

to the "critical" stages of the proceedings. 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967). See Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112 (1970).
A good example of this kind of analysis in considering Argersinger's applicability to summary courts-martial is the opinion of the U.S. District Court for Florida in Betonie v. Sizemore, 369 F. Supp. 340, 349-52 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
42The five courts are the U.S. District Courts for Hawaii, for the Central District of California, and for Florida; the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals; and the Court of Military Appeals.
See note 4 supra.
43COMA has fashioned the rule that "the protections in the Bill of Rights, except those
which are expressly or by necessary implication inapplicable, are available to members of our
armed forces." United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 430-31, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47
(1960); accord, United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967). This rule
has been used to overrule previous military law and require that the accused be afforded the
opportunity to be present with counsel at the taking of written depositions. United States v.
Jacoby, supra. COMA used the test again to apply the Supreme Court's ruling in Miranaiz to
the military and overturn a conviction obtained in violation of the federal court standard.
United States v. Tempia, supra.
In updating the UCMJ, Congress has employed essentially the same rule. I n amending
article 16 of the UCMJ in 1968, Congress adopted a provision modeled after rule 23a of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure with a modification to account for command influence,
a problem unique to the military community. S. REP.NO. 1601, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968).
T h e Supreme Court has implicitly sanctioned both the standard and its genesis: T h e standard provides in essence that servicemen have constitutional rights that are to be conditioned
only when overridden by the unique demands of the military. The Supreme Court agreed in
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. at 140, 142.
T h e same standard is applied by COMA which was established by Congress as the final
arbiter in this area. See note 24 supra. T h e Supreme Court has recognized such a balancing
role for Congress and, by implication, for COMA. Burns v. Wilson, supra at 140-41.
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judicial system justified the denial of the right to counsel in summary
court~-martial.~4
COMA ruled on the applicability of Argersinger in the case of United
~ ~ court's implementation of its standard for
States v . A l d e r r n ~ n .The
determining the applicability of constitutional rights in the military was
best delineated in Judge Duncan's concurring opinion, where he noted
that the record contained no evidence of military necessity sufficient to
warrant nonapplication of the Argersinger standard.46 The court
found a persuasive argument against the Navy's military-necessity position in the fact that the Army and Air Force had voluntarily applied
Argersinger to their summary court-martial procedures.47
3. Policy considerations. Considerations of policy also weigh in favor
of the applicability of Argersinger to the military courts. The only
servicemen who can be tried by summary courts-martial are those of
lowest rank.48 For the most part, they are the youngest in age and the
newest to the military system. The summary court-martial officer is
typically a lay officer with no special training in the law, who compares
quite unfavorably, in terms of ability to insure procedural propriety,
with the military judges or panels of officers presiding at general and
special courts-martial.49 Moreover, a conviction by summary courtmartial creates a criminal record that, in addition to the obvious consequences, can have significant repercussions in the sentencing following
any subsequent military misconduct.50 In the summary court-martial,
44TheNinth Circuit joined the other five courts in rejecting the argument that the affording
of counsel would adversely affect the military. 490 F.2d at 366. All the courts agreed with
Judge Duncan's position in Alderman that the Navy had shown no valid necessity for a rule
against providing counsel. 22 U.S.C.M.A. at 303, 46 C.M.R. at 303. T h e Fifth Circuit
reasoned that courts-martial and civilian trials are more similar than different, since in either
a conviction can result in deprivation of liberty, potential social stigma, and significant repercussions in the future. 496 F.2d at 1007.
Factually the strongest arguments against the Navy's military necessity contention are (1)
that the Army and Air Force have voluntarily complied with Argersinger, and (2) that the
Navy itself allows the assistance of privately retained counsel, with no reported claim that it
limits the effectiveness of summary courts-martial. Daigle v. Warner, 490 F.2d at 366; see
note 47 infra.
4522 U.S.C.M.A. 298,46 C.M.R. 298 (1973).
461d.at 303,46 C.M.R. at 303.
AND THE MILITARY
8 2-309 (1972); Daigle v. Warner, 348 F. Supp. 1074
47H. MOYER,
JUSTICE
n.14 (1972); Henry v. Warner, 357 F. Supp. 495 n.1 (1973). The Army ordered the change in
procedure in DA Message 1012362 dated August 10, 1972, which has been reprinted in T h e
Army Lawyer, August 1972, at 7. T h e Air Force directive was AFM 111-1 dated August 30,
1972.
48U.C.M.J. art. 20, 10 U.S.C. 3 820 (1970). See also note 3 supra. T h e Betonie court noted
this fact among its policy considerations favoring the applicability of right-to-counsel safeguards. 369 F. Supp. at 351.
49See Lermack, Summary and Special Courts-Martial: An Empirical Investigation, 18 ST.
LOUISU.L. REV. 329 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Lermack]. See also Fidell, T h e Summary
Court-Martial: A Proposal, 8 HARV.
J . LEGIS.571,578-84 (1971).
50Hearings on S. Res. 260 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
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then, one finds the coincidence of the military accused least able to defend himself being tried by the military court most unsuited to insure
legal rights with considerable consequences accompanying a conviction.
Providing the assistance of counsel is the best way to insure that the
military accused will receive the benefit of the available safeguards necessary to prevent violation of his rights.51 Just as the right to vote is preservative of all other rights in our political system,52so the right to counsel is determinative of all other legal rights in our judicial system.

B. Under What Circumstances Should Counsel Be Provided in
Summary Courts-Martial?
T h e opinions considering Argersinger's applicability to the military
raise additional questions concerning the circumstances under which
counsel should be provided in summary courts-martial.
I. T h e effect of confinement. Because it started from a fifth amendment due process base and looked to the probation-revocation hearing
standard as a guidepost, the Ninth Circuit ruled that counsel need be
appointed only when requested, and then only if it is evident that the
accused has a defense or a claim of mitigating circumstances that cannot
be adequately presented without the assistance of counsel. Furthermore,
the court provided that even this limited right can be denied if required
by the exigencies of military 0perations.~3
Argersinger, however, clearly required the appointment of counsel in
cases in which a sentence of imprisonment would be imposed,54 and
COMA and the Fifth Circuit found the sentence-of-confinement the
appropriate trigger for the right to provided counsel in the military setting.
2 . T h e effect of "equivalent punishments." However, in the military,
the range of sentencing possibilities includes "equivalent punishments,"55 e.g., hard labor, restriction to limits, and forfeiture of pay,
into which a possible sentence of confinement can be translated at the
C o m m . o n the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 838 (1962); U.S. DEP'TOF DEFENSE,
MANUAL
FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL
UNITED
STATES
7 75b (rev. ed. 1969).
5lA recent empirical study of minor courts-martial noted that while servicemen have a
right to a speedy trial, the greatest danger in the minor trials is a procedure that is too speedy.
While free continuances are supposed to be the rule, in the 83 minor courts-martial during 1
month in which the accused were unrepresented by counsel, there was only one continuance
granted. In the 51 courts-martial where accused were represented by counsel, continuances
were granted in 87 percent of the cases.
Even if the accused does not offer a defense, it is important to have counsel for the proper
presentation of mitigating circumstances. Lermack, supra note 49, at 348, 354-55, 377.
52Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964), citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
370 (1886).
53Daiglev. Warner, 490 F.2d at 364-65.
s4407 U.S. at 37-40.
MANUAL
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL
UNITED
STATES
ll 127 (rev. ed. 1969).
55U.S. DEP'TOF DEFENSE,
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court's discretion. Since any of these alternatives is considered adequate
punishment and each involves deprivation of liberty or property, the
Argersinger mandate should require defense counsel at a summary courtmartial before confinement or any of the "equivalent punishments" may
be imposed. Alternatively, the military could simply provide the right
to assistance of counsel, unless waived, to all servicemen tried by summary courts-martial.56
3. The efiect of indigency. Because indigency is a normal prerequisite
to the right to appointed counsel in civilian trials, the United States
District Court for Florida57 and Judge Quinn of COMA58 included a
requirement of indigency in their prescription for a right to provided
counsel in summary courts-martial. But Judge Duncan of COMA
argued that indigency is irrelevant in the military context.59 T h e UCMJ
does not limit the right to appointed counsel to indigents in any other
context; whenever the benefit of counsel is prescribed for servicemen,
it is always provided without regard to their financial status.60 Indigency,
therefore, should not be a precondition on the right to counsel before
summary courts-martial.

IV. CONCLUSION
The sixth amendment right to counsel, as extended to minor offense
trials by Argersinger, should apply in the military's summary courtsmartial. Under the COMA test for applicability, constitutional standards defined by the Supreme Court in both state and federal cases are
available in the military judicial system unless their adaptation or restriction is required by military peculiarity. The COMA rationale not only
mandates application of Argersinger to summary courts-martial, but
also is well suited for use in the continual process of considering the
appropriateness of constitutional standards in a military setting because
it properly balances the accused's rights as a citizen against his duties as
a soldier. The COMA test and its result in the Argersinger context
should be upheld by the Supreme Court when it considers the question
in Middendorfv. Henry.

56Justice Powell indicated that in his view the majority opinion in Argersinger foreshadows the adoption of a broad rule requiring counsel in all petty offense cases. 407 U.S. at
52.
S7Betoniev. Sizemore, 369 F. Supp. at 353.
58U.S.V. Alderman, 22 U.S.C.M.A.at 300,46 C.M.R. at 300.
592Z U.S.C.M.A. at 306,46 C.M.R. at 306.
GOLerrnack, supra note 49, at 368.

